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Ex-combatant Agency and Re-recruitment 
 
Sukanya Podder1 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Previous research on ex-combatant re-recruitment into armed violence has focused on the role of 
structures and facilitating conditions but has overlooked the question of individual agency and choices. 
The paper fills this gap in the literature by presenting an original typology of ex-combatant agency 
drawing on Albert Bandura’s social cognitive theory. Four types of agency, namely tactical, rational, 
reflective and moral are identified as corresponding with key characteristics of human agency namely: 
self-reactiveness, forethought, self-reflectiveness and intentionality. These interact with multiple 
enabling and inhibiting factors to shape ex-combatant decision-making. Premised on such a 
conceptualization, at least six types of choices are observed through a process of conceptual scoping 
that allow structure and agency to be considered in tandem. A critical engagement with disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) as a security practice exposes the problems with core 
terminologies and the politics surrounding the militarisation and demilitarisation of children and 
youth. It advances a critical security studies agenda in the study of ex-combatant reintegration.  
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Introduction 
 
DDR programmes attempt to dismantle militant organisations, and facilitate a return to civic 
life for erstwhile combatants. To date, DDR projects have been attempted in diverse contexts 
ranging from El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Sudan among others. Ex-combatants for the most part are conceptualized as a problem in 
need of reintegration. The danger of a return to violence is cited as the main reason for 
targeted donor assistance. Approached through a framework of assistencialism, ex-
combatants become passive recipients of programmes they do not contribute to in terms of 
their content or duration. Ex-combatant decision-making in itself is equally assumed to be 
inadequate or inconsequential to the larger dynamics of conflict relapse. This research is 
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pursued in direct response to this gap in the literature. It departs from previous studies that 
have mostly focused on the role of structures and the facilitating conditions for ex-combatant 
re-recruitment. Instead, a study informed by critical social inquiry is pursued to explore the 
different choices available to ex-combatants outside of the limits of reintegration and re-
recruitment.  
 
The aim here is to recover, and provide a more nuanced understanding of agency as a 
determinant of ex-combatant re-recruitment. The research follows a post-linguistic approach 
to security, by critically analyzing the processes and mechanisms of meaning production in 
the study of ex-combatant reintegration. It engages with DDR as an important security 
practice, and with ex-combatants and child soldiers as objects of this practice. By 
problematizing their role as targeted recipients without voice or agency, and the underlying 
normative dichotomies around categorising children and youth as security threats in the 
global South, the paper speaks to CSS’s fundamental concern with ‘the politics of security’ 
and advances the concept of ‘winners and losers’ associated with particular understandings 
and practices of DDR.  
 
In keeping with the ethnographic turn in critical security studies (CSS), the research 
acknowledges concerns with objectivity and bias in analyzing empirical studies around ex-
combatants and child soldiers. Mats Utas (2008) notes that research on ex-combatants draw 
on results from short-term fieldwork, or from quantitative approaches, with access to 
respondents arranged through humanitarian organisations. The problem with such approaches 
lie in that, they elicit responses in victim modes, thereby concealing important aspects of their 
lived experience. In Utas and Susan Shepler’s (2005) work on child soldiers, appeal to, and 
projection of this victim image, has been analysed as a form of tactical manipulation of 
cultural and economic capital. On the one hand ‘victimcy’ or victim agency, appeals to the 
normative and cultural ideas about childhood in the global North. One the other hand, it 
allows such groups to avail of humanitarian aid packages as a form of economic support. The 
overall result is a skewed representation of agency. One that is either overly weak or 
dangerously harmful.  
 
To mitigate these concerns, the research takes a pragmatic reflexive approach for reappraising 
multi-site empirical research and findings around ex-combatant lives. It engages with key 
normative and practical criteria used to categorise reintegration outcomes, and urges the use 
of social cognitive approaches to extend theorization around ex-combatant agency in ways 
that allow structure and agency related factors to be considered in tandem. While there can be 
no singular model for understanding how individual actors manoeuvre their way through 
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diverse post-conflict environments, such an approach allows us to at once question, passivity 
and victimization frameworks while qualifying the scope of agency as an exercise in 
unlimited choice (Aretxaga, 1997: 61).  
 
Begona Aretxaga’s research about the political tactics of nationalist women during the 1970s 
in Belfast, Northern Ireland advanced a similar idea of ‘choiceless decisions’. From a post-
structuralist feminist position, using interpretive anthropological methods, Aretxaga revealed 
how women in Catholic or nationalist districts of Belfast organised themselves into street 
committees and led popular forms of resistance against the policies of the government of 
Northern Ireland and after its demise, against those of the British. These hitherto invisible 
practices were an integral part of the social dynamic of the conflict and had important 
implications for the broader organisation of nationalist forms of resistance and gender 
relationships. Such an ethnographic framing is particularly valuable here, as it allows the 
agency of ex-combatants to be conceptualized as one of limited choice.  
 
The article is primarily an exercise in conceptual scoping. The first part discusses existing 
structural and individual level explanations on ex-combatant re-recruitment advanced in the 
literature on civil wars, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and ex-
combatant reintegration. The second part draws on insights from social cognitive theory, 
especially Albert Bandura’s work on human agency to develop a four-pronged typology of 
ex-combatant agency as a deductive theory. Six possible choices based on the analysis of 
agency are developed to highlight the possible applications of agency outside of a 
reintegration and re-recruitment spectrum. To understand how agency and choices relate and 
the structural influences that shape this interaction, six types of enabling and inhibiting factors 
are considered in the next part, followed by a concluding discussion.  
 
A note on terminology and scope is warranted. While the focus here is on ex-combatants as a 
social category, the research is mindful of the fact that this group is far from homogenous. 
Factional differences, contrasting political ideologies and social networks, along with 
divergent conflict related experiences could create different barriers to socialisation, stigma, 
mistrust and harmful stereotypes in a given context. For example, in the case of Sierra Leone, 
the experiences of ex-Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and ex-Civil Defence Force (CDF) 
fighters were not the same. This issue of contextual variation does not adequately inform 
DDR policies however. Standardization of DDR templates has resulted in underemphasizing 
the contrasting values or approaches to militarising youth.  
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Similarly the concepts of recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment vary considerably 
depending on one’s location in the global political economy. While the global North 
celebrates the coming of age of adolescents by encouraging them to take up gap year 
challenges as a taster to a military career, donors and humanitarian actors mourn the loss of 
innocence through activism around banning child soldier recruitment in Africa (Lee-Koo, 
2011: 725). These normative assumptions filter into responses around reintegration as well. In 
the global South, symptomatic of the collapsed social order into which integration is 
attempted the need for reform and a therapeutic restoration to childhood is mandated 
(Macmillan, 2009: 36). In contrast, in the global North, military service is viewed as a 
panacea to youth gun and knife crime, to deter young boys and teens from deprived socio-
economic backgrounds from joining disorganised forms of gang violence (Basham, 2011: 
175-176).  While in the global North certain groups of children and youth are viewed as a 
social problem, in the global South, ex-combatant youth and child soldiers are viewed as 
security threats, prone to erupt into violence, and in need of paternalistic policies that keep 
them busy, engaged or employed to discourage recidivism into future conflicts or crime. As a 
result, the discourse around ex-combatants becomes a bounded category, where only certain 
subjects, narratives and theories are admitted.  
 
Ex-Combatant Re-Recruitment: Structural and Individual Explanations 
 
Recent literature on DDR has addressed the question of ex-combatant re-recruitment in the 
context of the failure to reintegrate. Most studies set up the reintegration-re-recruitment 
relationship as an either or outcome. The main assumption is that when reintegration is 
unsuccessful it can lead to violent and criminal outcomes. Problems with access to 
reintegration support, unemployment, or broader flaws with DDR are also cited as possible 
factors (Themnér, 2013: 321-323). Jaremey McMullin suggests that, in Sierra Leone, the 
reintegration programme facilitated re-recruitment. Recruiters capitalized on ex-combatant 
anger at reintegration delays, and exclusion from DDR lists drawn up by commanders. They 
paid ex-combatants 500 United States dollars (USD) and promised them the opportunity to 
loot (2013a: 181). The feeling of not doing well out of DDR in Sierra Leone, therefore 
justified them rejoining the Liberian conflict to gain further reintegration benefits.  
 
Reintegration into poverty, limited job opportunities and experiences of re-marginalization 
are further arguments supporting the possibility of ex-combatant recidivism (McMullin, 
2004). Post-war societies present enormous problems of reconciliation and broader mistrust 
among previously warring groups. Ex-combatants in particular may feel stigmatized and 
excluded both in their communities of return and within the political arena. These tendencies 
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result in social re-marginalization and feelings of powerlessness among ex-combatants (Utas, 
2005: 137-154). They also result in limited employment opportunities especially in the formal 
sector. Ex-combatants may find reliance on and working or living with wartime associates 
often the best possible route to survival. Operating within wartime social networks however 
can create access into a range of illegal and informal, security, political, and criminal 
activities that capitalize on ex-combatants pre-existing skills, thereby reinforcing the need to 
either remain militarized or motivating a return to arms (Rozema, 2008: 423-452; Theidon, 
2009: 1-34; Maringira, 2015: 72-87). 
 
In addition to the identified structural-level triggers, there are a host of individual level 
explanations that have been advanced. Ex-combatants are likely to engage in violence 
because of certain personal characteristics. For example, if they are recruited at an early age, 
they can lack the education, training and skills required to compete in the labour market 
(Blattman and Annan, 2010: 882-898). Their security situation may be precarious, often 
targeted by security forces, local communities; and spoiler groups in revenge attacks or due to 
hostility related to wartime deeds (Themnér, 2013: 303). Rejoining armed groups can become 
a route to self-protection in such cases. In other instances, ex-combatant dissatisfaction with 
post-conflict outcomes can create disappointment and resentment, fuelling recidivism. For 
example, rewards such as official recognition, government jobs, pensions and financial 
rewards promised at the time of disarmament may not always follow through (Schafer, 1998: 
207-222). The non-distribution of promised credits and land in El Salvador, the lack of access 
to land in post-DDR Uganda, and problems with pensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina are some 
selective examples where dissatisfaction led to riots by ex-combatant groups (See, Collier, 
1994: 343-351; King, 2000: 329-333).  
 
The mental health of individual combatants can affect their willingness to disarm. Living in a 
constant state of anxiety can result in developing a stress response mechanism that invokes 
aggression, anger or fear (Banholzer, 2013: 332). The experience of chronic violence can 
have other negative impacts as well. Survey evidence from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Northern 
Uganda and Colombia suggests that individuals’ who did not return to communities where 
they lived before the war, exhibited greater difficulty gaining acceptance socially (Arjona and 
Kalyvas, 2006; Pugel, 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007). In contrast, ex-combatants 
that find positive experiences in combatant lifestyles such as status, money, followers and 
friends are predicted as more likely to rejoin (Theidon, 2009: 1-34). Becoming a civilian may 
not always be a priority partly because civilians do not understand the experiences of ex-
combatants (Hinojosa, 2010: 179-194).  
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Finally contextual variation is an important consideration in explaining divergent 
reintegration trajectories. The context into which American veterans from Iraq and 
Afghanistan reintegrate is markedly different from that of sub-Saharan Africa. DDR 
programmes are mostly attempted in poor post-conflict states where economic opportunities 
are non-existent, and reintegration into poverty is linked to the broader condition of state 
failure. Yet in recent times, scholars such as David Keen, argue that since the 2007 global 
financial crises, even in America, many lack access to healthcare, basic education, food 
security and experience pockets of state failure recreating conditions that can trigger 
recidivism due to socio-economic marginalization (Keen cited in McMullin, 2013b: 65).  
 
Limits of Current Explanations 
 
These arguments are not foolproof. There is limited evidence that DDR related economic 
rehabilitation assistance makes ex-combatant beneficiaries more likely to reintegrate 
politically and socially. Survey results from Burundi suggest that while the DDR programme 
reduced poverty levels among beneficiaries, economic gains did not result in greater political 
and social integration (Gilligan, Mvukiyehe and Samii, 2013: 599). In earlier studies, 
Humphreys and Weinstein found participants in the Sierra Leone DDR programme, not better 
reintegrated than non-participants (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007: 533). In Liberia, 
however, James Pugel found that participants in the DDR were more successful in 
reintegrating than non-participants (2006: 6). Scholars also find the impact of DDR limiting, 
given that large number of ex-combatants self-demobilize (de Vries and Wiegink, 2011: 38-
51). Reintegration programmes are rarely able to capture the entire pool of combatants, and 
increasingly civilians can cheat their way into DDR programmes (Munive and Jakobsen, 
2012: 359-385).  
 
There is also a lack of consensus on the definition of reintegration success. Most studies differ 
as to how they define reintegration success. Success can mean economic reintegration, 
political inclusion, social acceptance by communities, or a sum of all these attributes (Kriger, 
2003: 17-22). Most large-scale surveys with ex-combatants differ in their sampling strategy. 
Apart from sampling both participants and non-participants in DDR, there are selected 
measures of reintegration performance to be had. These can range from employment/income, 
community acceptance, democratic orientation, to affiliation with wartime networks for 
example. There is no standard design as to which attributes are chosen in any particular 
research or evaluation. As a result, often the percentage of ex-combatants that participate in 
DDR versus the actual percentage of ex-combatants that successfully reintegrate can vary 
greatly.  
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In Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein suggest that 86 percent of their sample had 
broken ties with their factions, 84 percent were employed, 62 percent expressed confidence in 
electoral politics and 93 percent felt accepted, although ex- RUF reported more problems of 
acceptance compared to ex-CDF (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007: 542-543). An ex-post 
evaluation of reintegration performance in Sierra Leone however suggests that 80-88 percent 
of trained ex-combatants were socially and economically integrated, and only 60 percent were 
employed (GIZ, 2010: 8). Besides this, there are inherent problems with identifying the actual 
composition of former combatants that are re-recruited, as there is often no reliable data 
available to verify who was re-recruited, when and into which types of armed groups or 
conflicts (Mitton, 2013: 321-337; Mutengesa, 2013: 338-356). 
 
Arguments about ex-combatant socialization through wartime networks as inherently 
negative or violence generating does not hold true in all cases. Evidence from DRC and the 
Republic of Congo (RoC) on ex-combatant trade associations, while acknowledging the 
continuity between wartime and peacetime leadership roles and patterns, emphasize how 
trade associations of ex-combatants were particularly conducive to reintegration (Lemasle, 
2012). The case of Bike Riders’ associations in Sierra Leone provides another example of this 
trend (Peters, 2007: 16).  
 
Similarly, the assumption that ex-combatants especially child soldiers are pre-disposed, 
vulnerable or susceptible to mobilization is also difficult to co-relate in practice. Recent 
scholarship suggests that ex-combatants shared memory of abuse can inoculate an entire 
generation against renewed hostilities (Mitton, 2013). Even with youth that have been 
forcibly recruited there is little evidence of aggression (Annan et al. 2009). Hill, Taylor, and 
Temin’s 2008 survey data on whether ex-combatants in Lofa county, Liberia would fight 
again found that two-thirds of Liberian ex-combatants would never go back to war. Another 
2008 Monrovia based survey found that only 2 of 466 young ex-combatant respondents said 
they would join an armed group if fighting were to resume and only one said he would join a 
conflict in a neighbouring country (Hill et al. 2008; Bøås and Hatløy, 2008: 51).  
 
Scholars such as McMullin, Mitton and de Vries and Wiegink among others have criticized 
the securitized logic justifying DDR as a form of an antidote to the threat from ex-combatants 
(de Vries and Wiegink, 2011; McMullin, 2013a; Mitton, 2013). By explaining that re-
recruitment is likely to be high when ex-combatants fail to reintegrate economically, policy 
makers reduce reintegration success to finding employment. Studies however find a negative 
co-relation between unemployment and violence (Berman et al., 2011: 496-528).  
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To reduce reintegration to economic outcomes is to deny ex-combatants a great deal of 
agency in being able to frame the choices that they understand themselves. At the same time, 
the question of ex-combatants in post-conflict societies as capable of agency assumes that 
they are not mere victims of circumstances and structures that they did not create or control. 
While ex-combatants as all other subjects can possess some degree of choice, and some 
capacity to act, it has to be qualified because ‘the agency of those in power is very different 
from that of those subjugated to power and dominance’ (Shaw, 2002: 19). In seeking a more 
nuanced approach the following section examines the underpinnings of ex-combatant agency 
before developing a four-pronged typology that guides the analysis on agency, choices and 
possible outcomes. 
 
Ex-Combatant Agency: A New Typology 
 
In the literature on conflict participation, combatant agency has been variously 
conceptualized. Using Long’s definition, Peters (2004) defines agency in post-conflict 
contexts as ‘the capacity to process social experiences and to devise ways of coping with life 
even under the most extreme forms of coercion’ (Long, 1992: 22-23; Peters, 2004: 7). 
Alcinda Honwana nuances this further through a distinction between tactical and strategic 
agency (2005: 31-52; 2006: 71; 1999: 4-13). The first is narrow and opportunistic, and 
exercised to cope with concrete, immediate conditions of their lives in order to maximize the 
circumstances created by their environment. The latter is based on a position of power that 
enables a certain degree of control over the self and the decisions taken. It is an agency of a 
longer time frame, where events and actions can be planned and are not only determined by 
random factors they could neither predict nor control (ibid).  
 
Scholars such as Henrik Vigh, Danny Hoffman, Mats Utas, Morten Bøås, Krijn Peters and 
Myriam Denov among others note that the tactical nature of ex-combatant life and thereby 
their agency has important implications not only for the kind of resources available but also 
how these are approached and defined (Utas, 2003; Vigh, 2006; Peters, 2007; Bøås, 2013; 
Denov, 2011; Hoffman, 2011). Resources here refer to the material base of actions including 
original skills, knowledge, network and alliances (Hagmann and Péclard, 2010: 547). 
Hoffman notes that the implications of agency are more intriguing in the case of children and 
youth (2003: 302). Agency appears as a misplaced analytical category in the context of 
western discourses that promulgate the popular image of a hapless, corrupted child 
conscripted into combat by coercion. Popular discourses make political distinctions meant to 
imply relative agency and apportion blame in ways that imply a lack of agency for children 
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and the opposite for youth (Utas, 2003: 29). When acknowledged, the agency of child soldiers 
is taken to be morally neutral yet capable of tremendous harm (Hoffman, 2003: 302-303).  
 
There is a need to study ex-combatant rationality and sense making in post-conflict societies 
through a deeper analysis of specific (local) circumstances and of subsequent choices and 
actions in individual cases. While diving deeper into the ethnographic particulars of the 
individual cases is outside the scope of the current piece, as a first step towards broadening 
the agency of ex-combatants, I develop a typology of agency as a deductive theory. Efforts to 
develop theories of human agency are not new. Theorists of practice such as Pierre Bourdieu 
and Anthony Giddens have examined the role of habitus and routines, rational choice 
theorists have emphasised purpose, communication based and some feminist theories have 
underlined the role of judgment and sociologists such as Emirbayer and Ann Mische have 
disaggregated agency across iterational, practical-evaluative and chordal triads (1998: 968-
971). Others such as Hitlin and Elder have focused on the time horizon to identify variants of 
human agency along existential, identity, pragmatic and life course dimensions (2007: 171).  
 
The typology of ex-combatant agency developed here draws on theoretical insights from 
social cognitive theory, rarely used in studies on ex-combatant reintegration. In the social 
psychology field, multiple contributions of agency and its dimensions exist (See, Clauser, 
1991; 1993; Alexander, 1992; 1993 among others). I draw on Albert Bandura’s research, 
given that it is less dismissive of context, an important element in ex-combatant behavior.  
 
Agency is conceived here as the ability to influence intentionally one’s functioning and life 
circumstances (Bandura, 2001: 1-26; Bandura, 2006:164-180). Four core properties of human 
agency structure individual choices and decisions within a social field. The first is 
intentionality. Intentions include plans and strategies; they involve actions to realize them 
both individually and in interaction with others. The second is forethought. It involves 
visualizing futures and anticipating outcomes. The third is self-reactiveness. It entails the 
ability to construct an appropriate course of action to motivate and regulate their execution. 
The fourth is self-reflectiveness. It represents a metacognitive capability to reflect upon 
oneself and the adequacy of ones thought and action (Ibid). While beliefs about how one 
should pursue their values or goals can determine actual behaviors, often intentions and 
values may or may not translate into actions and choices (Swidler, 1986: 273-286). This is 
because most ex-combatants make choices under some level of constraints. While this does 
not remove their agency and their ability to evaluate alternative coping strategies it does 
present nuances into how agency operates.  
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Bearing these in mind, it is possible to classify ex-combatant agency into four categories, 
namely, tactical, rational, moral and reflective (Figure 1). Each type correlates with a 
corresponding element of human agency discussed earlier. Tactical agency correlates with 
‘self-reactiveness’. It is responsive and fluid in character in that it makes use of opportunities 
as and when they arise. As a result it does not entail a great deal of strategic foresight or 
considered choice making. It helps individuals tackle situations that demand immediate 
responses, with results of their choices forthcoming in the short term. For ex-combatants, the 
post-conflict situation resembles a day to day analogue movement that creates an agency that 
by necessity becomes tactical and concentrates on the immediate, as strategic long term 
agency can be ill-afforded or is difficult to realize (Bøås, 2013: 612). Tactical agency enables 
ex-combatants to make choices that can maximize their opportunities under difficult 
circumstances (Peters, 2004: 30-31). Hoffman’s analogy of war as work, defines the decision 
to re-enlist as a ‘just in time mode of political, social and economic production’ (Hoffman, 
2012: 48, 52). Mobile willing youth had their skills for violence on sale in the political market 
place and reacted to opportunities for work without much analysis of the long-term outcomes 
of such a choice.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Rational agency is similar to forethought. It includes a cost-benefit analysis of future 
outcomes through current deliberation about the results of prospective actions. It involves an 
element of self-regulation in conjunction with deliberative ability and, therefore, assumes the 
ability to construct appropriate courses of action and to execute the same. It highlights the 
ability or intention of the individual to influence one’s functioning and life circumstances. 
The valued attributes of rationality are rooted in the ability to self-organize, self-regulate and 
self-reflect. Rational agency performs within a given set of historical circumstances and can 
vary at different times and places (Mkandawire, 2002: 189, 191). What might appear rational 
at a particular point in time can be less or more costly at a different point. In most cases ex-
combatants are likely to morally judge based on intuition, with rationalization of their 
decision likely to follow after the act (Pearce, 2013). Nichole Argo argues that rational choice 
operates differently depending on whether the self or communal orientated motivations are 
predominant. In case of self-orientated motivation, rationality is driven by consequentialist 
concerns regarding ends rather than means (2009: 654-655).  
 
In the literature, failure of the economic dimension to reintegration is viewed as the primary 
cause of ex-combatant recidivism, which in turn is tied to greed-based explanations for civil 
war recurrence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2009: 1-27). Opportunistic ex-combatants are likely to 
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be attracted to mercenary activity in pursuit of material gains. With communal oriented 
motivations, rationality is premised more on deontological concerns regarding the means 
rather than the ends (Argo, 2009). This makes the latter value oriented and driven by 
commands or demands that derive from ethical, religious, and social belief systems linked to 
the community. Religious or ideological fervor can produce re-recruitment via a rational 
calculus, in which martyrdom itself is a goal and the risks involved considered rational 
(Weinstein, 2004).  
 
The essence of moral agency relates to the idea of a moral compass that draws on the concept 
of the moral self. It describes an interior psychological state that is integral to the definition of 
the self (Noam and Wren, 1993). Moral agency has a strong individual quality. It aligns with 
positive intentions to take actions that can mitigate previous misdeeds. In the context of ex-
combatant reintegration processes, the practice of spiritual purification through the 
performance of traditional cleansing rituals are examples of how moral agency of the 
individual responds to social understandings of good versus evil (Honwana, 2002; 2005). 
Reassertion of intrinsic values can be triggered by life changing experiences such as death, 
loss and injury. It can also be a product of experiencing wrongdoing from close quarters, 
thereby triggering a renewed sense of choosing between right and wrong actions. Feelings of 
regret about past actions can offer the first steps towards accepting responsibility for 
wrongdoing. Admitting to one’s mistakes can present opportunities for reconciling with 
normal expectations around individual conduct. Moral agency can assist with the process of 
adopting non-violent, socially appropriate modes of behaviour that enable ex-combatants to 
succeed in the economic and social dimensions of reintegration. 
 
Reflective agency manifests through the exercise of metacognitive ability. It is closely related 
to moral agency in that the issue of beliefs and value systems are linked to the property of 
self-reflectiveness. It involves a functional self-awareness, i.e., the ability to reflect on 
personal actions, thoughts, and the repercussions of or the inherent value of one’s actions. It 
also includes the ability to consider corrective measures in recognition of wrongdoing. The 
latter can evoke feelings of moral redemption and, in extreme cases, encourage the practice of 
physical self-punishment. Ex-combatant’s willingness and ability to transition into civilian 
livelihoods is premised on their ability to reflect on and realize the implications of their role 
for the self and society both in its positive and negative aspects. Lessons drawn from being 
manipulated, or cheated by those in authority can pave the way for understanding the costs of 
complicity in the actions of others without adequate protection of both self and values. This 
ability to exercise moral self-judgment and to reflect on past actions can encourage ex-
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combatants to align future or planned action with stronger moral values and non-violent life-
paths that encourage reintegration.    
 
Ex-Combatant Choices: Six Possible Paths 
 
Based on the discussion about agency, ex-combatants can exercise various types of agency to 
choose reintegration, re-recruitment or something else. At the same time, it is difficult to draw 
a straight line between individual choices and the divergent outcome of reintegration and re-
recruitment. Several possible paths can exist. For example, ex-combatants may not be fully 
reintegrated into civilian livelihoods but this does not entail that they will necessarily be re-
recruited or that re-recruitment cannot be reversed in favor of desertion. In pursuing a more 
nuanced approach, it is possible to identify the different choices available to ex-combatants 
and relate these to the different types of agency identified. For analytical purposes, the focus 
here is limited to six types of choices. The selection of possible choices is based on available 
empirical findings around ex-combatant lives and livelihoods in post-conflict societies.  
 
The first choice is “Reintegration into civilian life without DDR support”.  Self-reintegration 
without partaking in a formal DDR programme is one possible outcome. The reasons for self-
reintegration can be various. The most common is the desire for anonymity linked to the fear 
of discrimination or political targeting (Peters, 2007: 12-14). Self-reintegration is pervasive 
among female ex-combatants. Most serve in support roles, and find it difficult to prove their 
active participation through the surrender of a weapon (Mazaruna, McKay, Carlson and 
Kasper, 2002: 116-119). In other cases, fear of stigma can make women view DDR 
participation as counterproductive to their reintegration (Bouta, 2005: 7). In Northern 
Uganda, the most common form of reintegration among female abductees was participation in 
a traditional cleansing ceremony followed by receiving amnesty, registering at a reception 
center and receiving a reinsertion package (Betancourt et al., 2014: 4). Another possibility in 
relation to non-participation is formal demobilization followed by dropping out of the DDR 
programme. In the decade long multi-country Great Lakes DDR programme, where 300,000 
combatants demobilized in seven countries, nearly 20 percent did not subsequently claim any 
reintegration benefits (MDRP, 2010: 24). 
 
The second choice is “Reintegration into civilian life with DDR support”. Across a range of 
countries where DDR programmes have been launched, many thousands have officially 
demobilized (Zena, 2013: 4). Participation rates vary depending on the context and content of 
the programme. Despite shortcomings, there is some evidence of successful reintegration as a 
result of DDR participation. In Burundi, for instance, ex-combatants demonstrated weak 
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motivation for re-recruitment, and readily took part in the DDR (Uvin, 2007: 11). 
Participation in DDR programmes however does not necessarily translate into individual 
success stories. In Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein estimated that nearly seven 
percent of demobilized fighters experienced severe problems with reintegration, and that this 
pool of nearly 5,000 unintegrated fighters were a threat to stability and susceptible to re-
recruitment by violence entrepreneurs (2007: 542). 
 
This situation can give rise to a third possibility, namely, “Participating in DDR, re-recruited 
but not unintegrated”. Ex-combatants integrated into powerful militarized networks that are 
explicitly political are likely to be re-recruited. Moving individuals from active members of a 
warring group into citizens that are willing to participate in peacetime politics requires 
transformation of prior attitudes. Individuals integrated into insurgent groups must be 
integrated into alternative political institutions and networks to prevent remobilization into 
armed political or economic formations. For example in DRC, while an approximate 200,000 
combatants were processed through the first round of national DDR, half were re-mobilized 
into security related vocations (MRDP, 2010: 3). Others were integrated into armed groups 
protecting the artisanal mining industry in the north and south Kivus controlled by members 
of the Congolese national army (Global Witness, 2011; Gimba, 2015: 13).  
 
The fourth choice is “Participation in DDR, unintegrated, but not re-recruited”.  The identity 
of ex-combatants linked to DDR participation can create an artificial separation, one that 
inhibits’ true integration (McMullin, 2013b, 233). The ex-combatant identity card carries and 
contains affective energies that are put to use in specific webs of social relations and that link 
the subject to the institutional structure of the DDR programme (Munive, 2014: 336-350). 
Post-DDR integration can be equally uncertain. Short-term training and education packages 
result in reintegrating ex-combatants into poverty and marginality. Few ex-combatants are 
able to apply their newly minted skills due to a lack of demand and depressed market 
conditions (McMullin, 2004). Lack of integration in the post-demobilization phase, does not 
necessarily entail re-recruitment into armed activities but can create cohorts that remain on 
the margins on society, at risk of remobilization into violence. Mats Utas (2003; 2005) has 
framed the problem facing ex-combatants as one of re-marginalisation and not reintegration. 
Inspite of DDR participation, integration can be a complex issue for combatants who are 
socialized into violence (Bøas and Bjørkhaug, 2011 Ferme, 2001; Hoffman, 2011). For 
example, demobilized combatants in Sierra Leone rejected rural life, and gerontocratic values 
after the war, choosing urban hustling and unemployment over life under the control of elders 
in the impoverished countryside (Bolten, 2012: 497). 
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The fifth choice is “Not participating in DDR, unintegrated and re-recruited”. In Sierra Leone 
and Liberia, surveys have indicated that 10-15 percent of ex-combatants opted not to 
participate in DDR at all (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007: 549). The role of DDR type 
benefits in inducing ex-combatants to reject militancy is often weak. It is more appealing to 
younger ex-combatants that lack training and education, have few family or kinship 
connections and require a new post-war support network. Foot soldiers depend on senior 
commanders for access into the programme. DDR benefits therefore operate as a ‘pay off’ 
mechanism that may not encourage all ex-combatants to abandon violence. Mid-level 
commanders can be among the most difficult group to reintegrate. Often disappointed with 
reintegration benefits on offer, they are likely to use organizational skills and wartime 
networks to engage in a range of illegal economic activities, crime as well as remobilization 
of former comrades into new conflicts. DDR rewards can even help the political economy of 
war to remain intact by providing commanders with more capital to fund their illicit 
businesses or to remobilize clients into new conflict formations (Jennings, 2008: 40-41). 
 
The sixth choice is “Not participating in DDR, re-recruited then deserting in favour of civilian 
life”. DDR participation, post-war integration and re-recruitment are largely determined by 
context and by ex-combatant attitudes towards insecurity, and the use of violence. While the 
securitization of reintegration means that ex-combatants are presented as having only violent 
rationalities (motivated to and by violence), and violence is asserted to be always and readily 
available to ex-combatants as soon as he or she encounters an obstacle along the path to 
reintegration (McMullin, 2013b: 247-249). In reality, ex-combatants are not inherently 
violent, they are professionals of violence, socialized, and trained into the use of violence. 
How they apply or refrain from such a technical or organizational skill depends on anticipated 
returns linked to a given context. It is also linked to psychological and behavioral aspects of 
individual disengagement from crime and militancy. Disillusionment arising from 
incongruence between the initial ideals and fantasies that shape a person’s initial 
involvement, physical burn out, changing personal priorities, and lack of fit with the new 
leadership have been cited as important reasons for disengagement (Oppenheim et al., 
2015: 794-823).  
 
Predicting Choice: Relating Agency, Influences and Outcomes 
 
Ex-combatant choices do not take shape in a vacuum. Ex-combatants resist violence or decide 
to engage in it because of a complex of enabling and inhibiting factors that operate across 
structural and individual level considerations. Previous research on militancy, crime and ex-
combatant recidivism identify these factors variously as ‘push and pull’ or ‘restraining and 
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driving forces’ (Kaplan and Nussio, 2016: 1-30).  In this research, six types of enabling and 
inhibiting factors are considered. These include enabling factors such as the pursuit of 
material gains, loyalty and commitment, excitement and adventure seeking, leadership, peer 
pressure, security and identity related considerations. Inhibiting factors include war-
weariness, trauma and injury, regret and feeling cheated, death and loss, family and future 
plans.  
 
Factors such as security and identity can be related to rational types of agency. The search for 
protection in a context of broader insecurity encourages a cost-benefit rationalization of the 
decision to re-enlist, both for the immediate and future contexts. Whether it is a weak post-
conflict state that is unable to provide security, or an incomplete dissolution of command and 
control structures of armed groups that have an interest in continuation of war (due to 
economic profiteering), structural insecurity has important implications for the personal 
security of ex-combatants (Walter, 1997: 335-364). Protection from targeted attacks by 
security forces, local communities or former adversaries in a context of broader insecurity can 
encourage ex-combatants to rejoin armed groups (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007: 177-216). It can 
also discourage combatants from demobilizing formally to protect their true identity.  
 
It is anticipated that security and identity in the context of ex-combatant agency encourages 
the choice of reintegration without DDR support through the exercise of rational agency. First 
hand experiences of violence and its resulting harm can encourage ex-combatants to draw up 
alternative future plans that are non-violent. The desire to create a family, build a normal 
career, or settle down into civic life, are identified as pull factors that can change life 
priorities in studies on militant disengagement, reinforcing their importance as influence 
variables (Alonso, 2011). These factors are conductive to the choice of reintegration as a 
rational decision. Rational agency presupposes deliberation over long-term consequences of 
any action. In the context of ex-combatant choices, reintegration involves a choice of self-
preservation, security and stability.  
 
Rational agency, would suggest that the benefits of reintegration, even without DDR support 
is likely to enhance the goal of safety, and security. Rejoining an armed group can present the 
opportunity for immediate security but is unlikely to contribute towards long-term stability. 
Identity issues are equally influential in encouraging the choice of reintegration over re-
recruitment. Ex-combatant identity can have peacetime value. Combat skills can present ex-
combatants opportunities to find employment in a new security sector. Even when formal 
employment is closed to ex-combatants, informal roles as vigilantes, private security 
contractors or as community policing groups can provide employment, and purpose.  
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Factors such as excitement, adventure-seeking, material gains and peer pressure 
notwithstanding their contextual variations are enabling in nature, in that they can encourage 
ex-combatant re-recruitment motivated by immediate gains. Tactical agency can encourage 
participation in DDR programmes as a form of material gain, as much as it can trigger re-
recruitment into new, armed formations in search of economic rewards linked to combat. Peer 
pressure, proximity and association are important pull factors. Ex-combatants who fought on 
the same side often constitute a distinct social group. Ex-fighters from the same faction may 
continue to fraternize long after leaving their armed units. These social networks mirror pre-
existing command structures and create strong horizontal links that positively affects the 
opportunity to resume fighting (Themnér, 2013).  Ex-combatants that formally demobilize, 
return to home communities, and reintegrate into civic roles, may still return to arms when 
called upon by previous comrades, due to a range of social, material and behavioral 
considerations.  
 
Excitement and adventure seeking can encourage re-enlistment through an exercise of tactical 
agency. Child soldiers have been documented to actively seek out membership of armed 
groups in search of the excitement and adventure associated with soldiering. In post-conflict 
societies, ex-combatants become part of urban gangs involved in crime, narcotics and the like 
to continue with a lifestyle involving alcohol, drugs, and violence that mimics combatant 
habitus. Ex-combatants influenced by excitement and adventure seeking, are unlikely to 
participate in DDR programmes. They remain integrated within their combatant networks and 
therefore unintegrated in the context of wider community and civic relationships.  
 
Reflective agency manifests at a cognitive level, resulting in a temporal shift in the 
psychological orientation towards violence. War-related severe stress, even though transient 
indelibly changes an individual on various levels (Schaal and Elbert, 2006: 95-105). Regret 
over the loss of education, sexual exploitation, false promises regarding future rewards are 
some of the practical and moral factors that can deter re-recruitment (Blattman and Annan, 
2010; Schafer, 1998). Reflective agency can also be linked to temporality in terms of age and 
changes in status (Thornberry, Huizinga and Loeber, 1995). Return to school, to one’s family 
or even the discovery of alternative belief systems, can enable ex-combatants to establish new 
identities, belief structures and social relationships. In terms of outcomes, reflective agency 
can encourage participation in DDR programmes, and reintegration among those who 
experience war-weariness, regret and feelings of being cheated.  
 
Reflective agency operates differently for those who experience rise in leadership ranks. The 
ability to shape the direction of group strategies is associated with positive combat 
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experiences (Fuest, 2008: 201-224). The desire to regain wartime leadership privileges and 
associated benefits (status, money, followers, friends, and access to political power) can 
encourage ex-combatants to rejoin armed conflicts. Equally, capable soldiers with proven 
leadership skills are more likely to be approached both by entrepreneurs of violence and by 
their subordinates to remobilize and regroup under favorable conditions.1  
 
Death, loss, trauma and injury are associated with moral agency. Death of a loved one can 
weaken the desire to continue fighting as can witnessing death at close quarters (Winkler, 
2010: 13-14). On a cognitive level, traumatic experiences can shatter the most fundamental 
beliefs about safety, trust and self-esteem, creating instability and psychological incoherence 
in an individual’s internal and external worlds (Berg et al., 1998: 35-47). Disability caused by 
injury can further enhance dependency on others, reduce chances of finding employment and 
create negative relationships with partners due to physiological and esteem related issues 
(Lord and Stein, 2015: 277-292).  
 
Under the influence of factors associated with moral agency, ex-combatants may readjust 
their value system in order to make it in accordance with their new patterns of behavior. Ex-
combatants may choose to desert, or stay away from formal demobilization processes. Studies 
on militant disengagement suggest that from a moral perspective, changing violent behavior 
is more important than changing radical attitudes (Horgan, 2009). Based on such an analysis 
of the interaction between agency, influences and outcomes, it is possible to predict that 
rational agency can lead to Choices One and Two, namely, “reintegration into civilian life 
both with and without DDR support”. Tactical agency can lead to Choices Three and Five; 
“participating in DDR, re-recruited but not unintegrated, and, not participating in DDR, 
unintegrated and re-recruited respectively”. Reflective agency can lead to Choice Four, 
“participating in DDR, remaining unintegrated but not re-recruited,” and moral agency can 
lead to Choice Six, “not participating in DDR, re-recruited then deserting” (Table 2).  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Conclusion 
 
Ex-combatants can exercise various types of agency to choose between re-recruitment and 
reintegration. Ex-combatants act tactically in choosing re-recruitment, while they may be 
more strategic in choosing reintegration. Rational agency assumes that individuals exercise a 
certain level of deliberation and awareness of the meaning and consequences of their actions 
and choices whether it favors reintegration or re-recruitment. Moral and reflective forms of 
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agency encourage non-violent life-paths and assist with successful reintegration. In order for 
ex-combatant agency to be taken seriously as a conceptual category and as an analytical lens, 
it needs to be applied within reintegration practice. It needs to be seen as more than a 
phenomenon that is tactical and reactive, in line with established assumptions about ex-
combatant behavior. To be successful in design and implementation, reintegration discourses 
need to step back and observe the agency of its participants. Ex-combatant capacity for 
survival and for rebuilding civilian lives with or without formal support can be a powerful 
angle to approach this cohort. Acknowledging their capacity to resist violence can help policy 
makers harness their positive agency especially into security sector reform processes. It can 
also help international actors to transcend the tick box nature of DDR programmes.  
 
Future research should be conducted in other settings with similar scope conditions to test the 
theory of ex-combatant agency. Some areas of inquiry include for example, investigating how 
ex-combatants from different warring factions embrace opportunities to become part of a new 
national army or police? While the current focus of the literature on peace building is on the 
process of inclusion and exclusion of different groups in a post-conflict security sector and 
associated grievances, gaps exist in applying an agency framework to understand the 
consequences of such inclusion or exclusion. The application of social cognitive approaches 
can be further refined, through the use of longitudinal studies that map shifts in ex-combatant 
behavior beyond the immediate years of reintegration support. Understanding how 
individuals respond to changes in the structural environment characterized by post-conflict 
peacebuilding and security sector interventions can help identify alternative mechanisms to 
encourage positive agency and integration among ex-combatant groups beyond short-term 
reintegration support. 
 
The findings from this study will have three important contributions. First, through a critical 
engagement with the normative assumptions underlying core DDR terminologies namely, 
‘ex-combatant’, ‘reintegration’ and ‘re-recruitment’, the study contributes to the scholarship 
around the design and effectiveness of DDR as a security practice. Second, by highlighting 
the contextual nuances surrounding the lived experiences of children and young people, the 
politics surrounding the militarisation and demilitarisation of children and youth is exposed. 
Third, by drawing on insights from social cognitive theory, a new typology on ex-combatant 
agency is developed in ways that allow ex-combatant behaviour to be studied through the 
prism of structural, individual and contextual level factors. Through its overall engagement 
with the politics of DDR as a security practice and by approaching ex-combatant agency as an 
exercise in limited choice the study advances a critical security studies agenda in the study of 
ex-combatant reintegration.  
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These findings will enable us to think and engage with ex-combatants and child soldiers in 
ways that avoid falling into commonplace assumptions that do not accommodate the 
heterogeneity of lived experience. Critical social inquiry and an ethnographic framing around 
the motivations and choices of child soldiers and youth combatants can help dispel myths that 
endure in public discourse and, to a somewhat lesser but still significant extent, in scholarly 
and activist literatures. The recent critiques of moral panics regarding ‘youth bulges’ 
highlight the starkly different approaches put forward to tackle the perceived insecurity and 
threat from youthful cohorts. In the United Kingdom, military service has been argued by 
some to be the solution to the 'threat' presumed to inhere in the under-served young male 
demographic. This stands in stark contrast to the demobilisation and reintegration into civilian 
life that dominates the discourses around child soldiers in the global South. A postcolonial or 
critical race perspective might aid further consideration of this question. 
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